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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
V • I 
JAMES LOUIS HOLLAND, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 870410 
Category No. 1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an automatic review of a conviction of capital 
homicide in the Third District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review this case under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(10) (Supp. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should this Court consider the issues raised by 
defense counsel on appeal where none of them are manifest 
prejudicial errors, or even error at allf and where defendant has 
stated he does not want to appeal? 
2. Does S 76-5-202(1)(h) violate the double jeopardy 
clause by enhancing the punishment for murder from second degree 
to first degree murder with the aggravating circumstance that the 
defendant was previously convicted of first or second degree 
murder prior to committing the instant offense? 
3. Did the trial court correctly find defendant competent 
to proceed with the penalty hearing where defendant refused to 
participate in further evaluation of his competency and where the 
psychologist merely stated a conclusion that defendant 
was incompetent supported only by unexplained psychological labels? 
4, Did the court abuse its discretion by imposing the 
death penalty on the defendant in the face of aggravating 
evidence that outweighed the mitigating evidence and evidence 
that the death penalty was appropriate based upon the nature of 
the crime, defendant's background and character and propensity to 
commit future crimes of violence? 
5. Is Utah's death penalty constitutional? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with first degree murder, a 
capital felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) 
(Supp.1987), and two counts of theft, second and third degree 
felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). After 
a preliminary hearing on August 18, 1987, defendant pled guilty 
to first degree murder on September 1, 1987 before Judge Homer F. 
Wilkinson in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County. 
The court dismissed both counts of theft on the State's motion. 
Defendant waived his right to a jury for the penalty phase 
hearing which occurred on September 17, 1987. Judge Wilkinson 
sentenced defendant to death by lethal injection on September 30, 
1987. 
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traffic lane where it was parked (P.T. 31) . Before he left the 
scene, defendant cleaned the shattered glass from the car, 
removed some blankets from the front seat that might have blood 
on them and took Patt's wallet containing $250-350 (P.T. 20, 31-
32). 
Travelling on to Pueblo, Colorado, defendant threw 
Patt's wallet from the car in Wyoming (P.T. 21, 32-33). 
Defendant abandoned Patt's car in Pueblo and was eventually 
apprehended in Florida (P.T. 21, 24). While travelling back to 
Utah from Florida, defendant confessed these facts to Summit 
County Sheriff's Detective Joseph Offret (P.T. 16, 25). 
Defendant displayed no remorse for his crime (P.T. 33) . 
Further facts, including the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence that was introduced at the penalty phase, are developed 
below in relevant portions of the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should not consider the issues raised by 
defense counsel but should follow Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(10) 
and review the record for manifest, prejudicial error because 
defendant does not want an appeal. 
Defendant is not twice placed in jeopardy for a 
previous murder where this conviction for first degree murder 
relies on that previous murder as an aggravating circumstance. 
By using the previous murder to aggravate an intentional and 
knowing murder to first degree murder, the Legislature is merely 
recognizing the long accepted practice of treating repeat 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW PROVISION DOES NOT 
CONTEMPLATE BRIEFING OF ISSUES FRAMED BY 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WHERE DEFENDANT DESIRES NO 
APPEAL, THUS, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLAIMS BUT SHOULD REVIEW 
THE RECORD FOR MANIFEST, PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
ONLY. 
Defendant in this case has expressed his desire to this 
Court and to the State that he does not wish to appeal his death 
sentence. See Appendix A. This Court, nevertheless, ordered 
defense counsel to submit an appellant's brief. The State urges 
this Court to reconsider its ruling on the grounds that Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1987) which provides that "Ii]n 
capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, and 
the defendant has chosen not to pursue his own appeal, the case 
shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . ," 
does not require such briefing and because the order is contrary 
to defendant's wishes and defense counsel's duty to represent his 
client in the manner in which the client desires to be 
represented. 
In ordering defense counsel to brief this case, this 
Court required essentially that counsel create issues for appeal 
where defendant desired no appeal. None of the issues raised by 
counsel are manifest, prejudicial error. Where defendant does 
not desire an appeal, and wishes therefore to raise n£ issues, 
this Court should merely review the record for manifest, 
prejudicial error. See State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 
(Dec. 22, 1987) (court will review record in capital case for 
manifest, prejudicial error not preserved by defendant). 
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previously convicted of first or second degree murder. He 
suggests that this scheme is more than mere enhancement of the 
punishment for the present murder conviction, but punishes him 
twice for the previous murder simply because the previous murder 
conviction is an element of the crime which the State must prove 
at the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, he attempts to 
distinguish §76-5-202(1) (h) from habitual criminal statutes which 
have been upheld against similar attacks and concludes that 
defendant should have been convicted of second degree murder 
because the use of his prior murder conviction to aggravate this 
murder is unconstitutional. Defendant's reasoning is flawed. 
As stated by the Supreme Court, "the propriety of 
inflicting severer punishment upon old offenders has long been 
recognized in this country and in England. They are not punished 
the second time for the earlier offense, but the repetition of 
criminal conduct aggravates their guilt and justifies heavier 
penalties when they are again convicted." Graham v. West 
Virginia. 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912). The Court reaffirmed this 
principle in Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) (increased 
degree of crime of escape depending on degree of crime for which 
defendant serving time when escaped not double jeopardy 
violation), and in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). Based 
upon this reasoning, the Alabama Supreme Court held that there 
was no double jeopardy violation in its first degree murder 
statute including as an element of the crime a prior conviction 
for murder. Arthur v. State, 472 So. 2d 650 (Ala Cr. App. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds, 472 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1985). 
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The effect of including as an element of first degree 
murder a prior conviction for murder is increased punishment. 
Removing this as an element of the crime and creating another 
statutory scheme whereby this aggravating circumstance would not 
apply until the penalty phase would serve no real distinguishing 
purpose in the context of double jeopardy analysis and defendant 
presents no convincing argument to the contrary. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND DEFENDANT 
COMPETENT TO PROCEED WITH THE PENALTY 
PHASE OF THE TRIAL, 
On appeal defense counsel argues that defendant should 
have received a continuance to present further evidence on the 
issue of his competence to proceed with the penalty phase of the 
trial. Counsel claims that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in proceeding to the penalty phase in the face of the 
psychologists request for more time to evaluate defendant. This 
claim lacks merit because defendant himself refused to cooperate 
with such an evaluation and there was no convincing evidence that 
defendant was incompetent to proceed. 
At the beginning of the penalty phase hearing, defense 
counsel asked for a continuance so that Dr. Michael Decaria could 
have more time to evaluate defendant in light of unspecified 
information that had come to light as late as the day before the 
bearing (P.T. 3,8). The State agreed to the continuance, 
however, defendant himself opposed the continuance and stated 
that he would not speak to Dr. Decaria any further (P.T. 4-5, 7, 
-9-
9-10) • In light of defendant's statements that he wanted to 
proceed with the hearing and that he would not cooperate with 
psychological evaluations, the trial court properly decided to 
proceed with the hearing as scheduled. This is especially true 
where defense counsel did not specify precisely what it was that 
concerned him about Dr. Decaria's state of preparedness. Nor did 
defense counsel specifically state that he was concerned about 
defendant's competency to proceed but only that Dr. Decaria 
wanted to evaluate defendant further for purposes of the penalty 
hearing. 
While it is true that Dr. Decaria stated that he did 
not feel defendant was competent to plead guilty when he 
testified later in the penalty hearing, his opinion was not 
sufficiently supported by reasoning based upon his evaluation of 
defendant. As occurred in State v. Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 
57, 58-59 (Jan. 11, 1988), Dr. Decaria simply tagged defendant 
with a mental disorder, clinical depression, but did not explain 
how this disorder prevented him from understanding the nature of 
the proceedings and potential punishment or from assisting his 
attorney in his defense. And see Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 
(1982). He stated that though defendant did not want to die, his 
decision to proceed with the penalty hearing instead of 
continuing it indicated he was not competent to proceed (P.T. 
161-162). 
Because Dr. Decaria simply tagged defendant with a 
psychological label without explaining how this mental disorder 
affected his ability to understand the proceedings and aid his 
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attorney, and also acknowledged that defendant understood the 
nature of the proceedings (P.T. 161), the trial court did not 
err in failing to continue the hearing after Dr. Decaria 
testified.2 fcafferty# 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59; Carter v. United 
££jjL£££, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Campbell v. United 
States. 307 F.2d 597, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J. 
dissenting). Dr. Decaria merely expressed his conclusion that 
defendant was incompetent without explaining how he reached that 
conclusion; thus, the judge was free to reject Dr. Decaria's 
opinion. Lafferty, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 60. 
The Court could also properly have rejected Dr. 
Decaria's opinion that defendant was incompetent because Dr. 
Decaria admitted that he had performed no psychological tests on 
defendant and had spent a total of only three and one half hours 
evaluating defendant (P.T. 165). Moreover, Dr. Decaria admitted 
that he is philosophically opposed to the death penalty, that 
most of his income results from being employed as a defense 
expert in death penalty cases and that he was retained by the 
defense for six out of nine capital cases to be tried that fall 
(P.T. 163-164). The court could properly have concluded that Dr. 
Decaria's opinion that defendant was incompetent was clouded by 
his philosophical opposition to the death penalty since Dr. 
Decaria worded his opinion in a manner that suggested that he 
* While defendant did not ask the Court for a continuance after 
Dr. Dacaria testified, counsel's argument on appeal suggests that 
the court should have granted such a continuance, presumably sua 
sponte. In light of State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 
(Dec. 22, 1987), this Court should reverse the trial court only 
if there was manifest, prejudicial error. 
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felt that anyone who acquiesced to the death penalty was 
incompetent (See P.T. 161-62). Howeverf as the Supreme Court has 
stated: 
The idea that the deliberate decision of one 
under sentence of death to abandon possible 
additional legal avenues of attack on that 
sentence cannot be a rational decision, 
regardless of its motive, suggests that the 
preservation of one's own life at whatever 
cost is the summum bonum, a proposition with 
respect to which the greatest philosophers 
and theologians have not agreed and with 
respect to which the United States Constitu-
tion by its terms does not speak. 
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1310, 1312-14 (1979). 
It is also true that defendant testified during the 
hearing that he would participate in therapy with Dr. Decaria if 
he received a life sentence (P.T. 105). This testimony, however, 
is not inconsistent with his refusal to participate in further 
evaluation that would delay the penalty hearing. It did not 
demonstrate that he had changed his mind on this point and 
determined to cooperate in an attempt to delay the hearing since 
defense counsel asked him about therapy that would occur only if 
defendant received a life sentence. Consequently, there was no 
basis for the court to assume that defendant would cooperate with 
an evaluation before it imposed the sentence. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON DEFENDANT. 
Defense counsel asserts that defendant should not have 
received the death penalty because it is not an appropriate 
punishment in the circumstances of this crime. He claims that 
defendant was guilty at most of manslaughter or second degree 
murder, that he suffered from a psychological disorder and was 
not competent to proceed. The substance of both of these claims 
is addressed in the preceding Points I and II. 
It is appropriate to point outf however, that the facts 
of defendant's crime support the sentence of death. The evidence 
reveals that defendant shot Sam Patt at very close range because 
Mr. Patt decided to expel defendant from his car and defendant 
did not want to get out of the car. Defendant then took Mr. 
Patt's wallet and car. Defendant expressed no remorse for his crime. 
Further, defendant was previously convicted of robbery 
with a firearm in Florida on July 22, 1987 and murder in Iowa on 
October 29, 1964, and had murdered Karl Behm at the rest stop 
where he met Mr. Patt (P.T. 43-55, 63). Defendant shot the Iowa 
man because the man wanted him to go swimming and defendant did 
not want to go swimming. Defendant shot Mr. Behm in the chest 
while he slept in his parked car because Mr. Behm said defendant 
was a bum (P.T. 60-62) • Defendant said that he would have killed 
at least four other people at the rest stop but they left before 
he had an opportunity to shoot them (P.T. 60-61) . Defendant was 
not remorseful for this murder either, stating that Behm got what 
he deserved for calling defendant a bum (P.T. 63). 
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In mitigation, defendant offered little evidence. He 
testified that he had a deprived childhood, spending most of his 
life from the age of nine in reform school and prison (P.T. 75-
88# 93). He claimed that he was ridiculed in reform school and 
beaten in prison (P.T. 76, 78, 81). He further claimed that his 
Iowa murder trial was unfair because he was unable to introduce 
evidence that his victim was a child molester who may have been 
attempting to sodomize defendant when he insisted that defendant 
go swimming with him (P.T. 84-85, 87). Defendant was 24 years 
old at the time (P.T. 82-83). 
Much of defendant's own testimony supported the court's 
finding that the death penalty was appropriate. When he was 
released from prison in 1985, defendant said he felt lost because 
all of his friends were in prison, that he did stupid things 
trying to get caught and returned to prison, and that he felt 
better in prison than outside (P.T. 89, 92). He also stated 
several times that sometimes he just gets mad and if he does not 
stop himself before something happens, he blows up and might do 
anything but that he can control this by leaving before something 
happens (P.T. 91, 96, 98). He did not know why he did not just 
get out of the car and avoid trouble when Mr. Patt told him to 
get out even though he felt that something might happen before it 
actually did (P.T. 128). Defendant said he is able to control 
hie temper in prison and has never hurt anyone in prison because 
he feels comfortable there but on the outside, people just laugh 
at him and ridicule him (P.T. 101, 105-106). He also admitted, 
however, that he had been convicted of escape about three times 
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and of possession of a weapon while in prison (P.T. 107-108) . He 
speculated that it was possible that he might get mad and hurt 
someone in prison because he never knows what he might do from 
one minute to the next and because he anticipated having a weapon 
in the prison if sent there (P.T. 131)• 
Defendant said that he always carries a gun outside of 
prison and that he had several different weapons at different 
times including a .32, a .38, a .357, and a .45 even though he 
knows as a parolee he is not allowed to carry a firearm (P.T. 
114, 123). He admitted that he committed several armed robberies 
during 1987 (P.T. 123-126, 129). 
Dr. Michael Decaria, a clinical psychologist, testified 
in mitigation that defendant never developed a moral conscience 
and that he suffered from depression (P.T. 135, 144, 153, 156). 
Defendant knows what society considers to be right and wrong, but 
he does not feel guilt over transgressions (P.T. 145). In Dr. 
Decaria's opinion, defendant is not capable of functioning 
outside of prison but can function within prison (P.T. 152). 
When he killed Sam Patt, defendant was overwhelmed with a 
primitive urge to protect himself from being put out into the 
cold according to Dr. Decaria (P.T. 155-156) and defendant's 
depression contributed to commission of the crime (P.T. 158). 
Dr. Decaria felt, however, that defendant would continue to 
commit crimes if outside of prison (P.T. 159). 
Based upon the aggravating circumstances of the crime 
and defendant's propensity to commit other violent crimes and the 
fact that defendant felt no remorse for his crimes, the trial 
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court appropriately chose the death penalty. Defendant's claim 
that he was guilty at most of second degree murder or 
manslaughter is unsupported by the facts adduced from his own 
confession and testimony at the penalty hearing. 
POINT V 
UTAH'S DEATH PENALTY IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Points IV, V, VI, VII and VIII of his brief, defense 
counsel asserts that Utah's death penalty is unconstitutional for 
several reasons. These claims were previously disposed of by 
this Court in State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 19 (filed 
Feb. 3, 1988). Bishop holds that the death penalty is 
constitutional in the face of challenges that it is cruel and 
unusual punishment, that it violates principles of due process 
and equal protection, that the sentencing authority is allowed 
too much discretion in determining the appropriate penalty absent 
instructions on how to consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, that the statutory scheme shifts the burden of 
proof to the defendant in the penalty phase and that there is 
inadequate review by this Court because there are no written 
findings of the aggravation and mitigation. Counsel's current 
claims of unconstitutionality, though possibly articulated 
differently, are similar in substance to those recently 
reconsidered by this Court in Bishop and, under the reasoning of 
the cases referred to in Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, n. 65, this 
Court should again uphold the Utah death penalty. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's death sentence and find that the Utah death 
penalty is constitutional, 
RESPECTFULLY, submitted this I2ih day of April, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
>Qt?:<^v 
SANDRA L. -ATDGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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